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I. Introduction
In the first week of September 2001, Mexican president Vicente Fox intensified the
North American labor migration' issue, by setting a year-end deadline for a bilateral
migration agreement between the United States and Mexico. While the four-month dead-
line came as a shock to U.S. officials, there can be no surprise that the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has long been moving its member nations toward a
European Union-styled, common market approach to immigration. The push for freer
movement of member citizens across NAFTA borders is an argument that has accompa-
nied NAFTA since its inception.2
While in the 1990's, the Bush administration refused to address immigration issues
in the original NAFTA negotiations, economists and immigration experts declared that
open trade and open borders went hand-in-hand.3 Not only that, they predicted that
easing immigration restrictions could stem the flow of illegal immigration and help
the U.S. economy.4 Yet as a purely trade-oriented agreement, NAFTA never directly
broached the subject of immigration. Now, almost ten years later, proponents of open
borders appear vindicated by the natural developments brought about by NAFTA. The
1. Migration typically refers to the movement of people between nations, whereas immigration
defines a one-way move from one country to another, with the intent of resettling in the new
country. The United States has historically dealt with migration issues within the context of
its immigration policy, (rather than as a separate migration policy).
2. See Kevin R. Johnson, Free Trade and Closed Borders: NAFTA and Mexican Immigration to
the United States, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 937, 952-53 (1994); William A. Orme, Toward a
Common Market: The New North America, in UNDERSTANDING NAFTA: MEXICO, FREE TRADE,
AND THE NEW NORTH AMERICA 288, 317 (William A. Orme, Jr., ed. 1996).
3. Howard F. Chang, Migration as International Trade: The Economic Gains from the Liberalized
Movement of Labor, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 371, 372 (1998); Noemi Gal-Or,
Labor Mobility Under NAFTA: Regulatory Policy Spearheading the Social Supplement to the
International Trade Regime, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 365, 385 (1998); see, e.g., Gene
McNary, Moving Goods and People in International Commerce: Remarks of the Honorable Gene
McNary, 2 DUKE L.J. COMP. & INT'L L. 247, 247-48 (1992).
4. Johnson, supra note 2, at 961; see Philip L. Martin, Reconsidering Immigration in an Integrat-
ing World: Economic Integration and Migration: The Case of NAFTA, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 419, 422 (1998); see Doris Meissner, A New Deal with Mexico, WASH. POST,
Aug. 8, 2001, at A19.
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demand for Business (H-1B) visas increase annually,5 Mexico's economy has stabilized,6
and once-estranged neighbors-the United States and Mexico-have grown economically
interdependent.7 As President Fox asserts, NAFTA stands ready to take the next logical
step-moving toward a common market and virtually lifting immigration restrictions.'
Forging a bilateral migration agreement between the United States and Mexico is a
logical step toward developing closer foreign relations with Mexico.9 Formulating a work-
ing solution to the illegal immigration problem is also essential.'" Now more than ever,
the current Bush administration is discovering that the United States cannot go it alone
in the international arena." Even before the events of September 11, 2001, President
George W. Bush noted that "the best foreign policy means [having] a good neighbor-
hood."'12 Following President Bush's simple adage can result in profound benefits to both
the United States and Mexico. In developing a relationship with Mexico as a trusted ally,
rather than regarding our southern neighbor suspiciously, the United States stands to
gain the maximum benefits of NAFTA-greater competitiveness in international trade. 3
The election of Vicente Fox to the Mexican presidency increases the likelihood that
these policy initiatives will eventually succeed. 4 President Fox has made it clear, that it is
time Mexico escaped its past stereotype as the needy, troublesome neighbor of the United
States, and came into its own as a global presence. 5 The United States is wise to develop
close international relations with Mexico to ensure continued economic development,
and the presence of a valuable ally to the south. A step in developing that relationship
is to negotiate a bilateral migration agreement with Mexico.' 6 A bilateral agreement is
5. Jung S. Hahm, American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998: Balancing
Economic and Labor Interests Under the New H-lB Visa Program, 85 CORNELL L. Rev. 1673,
1675 (2000).
6. See Judy Shelton, Giving Mexico a Helping Hand, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 2001, at A26.
7. See id.; Robert Fife & Alan Toulin, U.S. Aims to Dismantle Borders; New U.S. Ambassador
Wants to Harmonize Immigration, Energy and More: 'Is There a NAFTA-plus?" NAT'L POST
(Ottawa), June 30, 2001, at Al; see John Simons, Even in a Recession, the U.S. Economy
Depends on Immigration, FORTUNE, Nov. 26, 2001.
8. Drew Fagan, The Big Picture, U.S. Policies Mean New North America is a Long Way Off, GLOBE &
MAIL (Toronto), Sept. 5, 2001, at B14; see Fife, supra note 7, at Al; see Dana Milbank &
Mary Beth Sheridan, Fox Presses for Immigration Agreement; Mexican Leader Seeks Pact with
U.S. by Year's End, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2001 at Al; see Shelton, supra note 6, at A26.
9. See Luis Herrera-Lasso, The Impact of U.S. Immigration Policy on U.S.-Mexico Relations, 3
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 357, 370 (1998).
10. Stephen Moore, U.S.-Mexico Migration: Testimony Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary
Subcomm. on Immigration, 107th Cong. (Sept. 7, 2001), available at 2001 WL 26186268.
11. George Gedda, U.S. Foreign Policy Now More Focused, Assoc. PRESS, Sept. 29, 2001, available
at 2001 WL 28013701.
12. Id.
13. See generally Fife, supra note 8, at Al (reporting on the benefits of further United States-
Mexican integration).
14. See Historic Opportunity for Two Border Nations, PALM BEACH POST, Sept. 5, 2001, available
at 2001 WL 27067642.
15. Mexico was recently accepted as a temporary member of the United Nations (U.N.) Security
Council.
16. See generally Herrera-Lasso, supra note 9.
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necessary in order to prove the United States' commitment to developing its relationship
with Mexico.17 With its long history of imposing its unilateral immigration policy on
Mexico, the United States must show that it is actually willing to negotiate with, rather
than merely overpower, Mexico.18
In addition to improving international relationships, this step toward a more open
immigration policy makes economic sense. Furthermore, from a U.S. perspective, pub-
lic acceptance of a liberalized migration policy appears much greater today than in
1993, when the NAFTA terms were originally negotiated.' 9 Yet many obstacles still stand
in the path. Since the tragedy of September 11th, Congress has taken a protectionist
stance.2° Even before that, protectionists continued to raise many of the same argu-
ments aired during the initial drafting of NAFTA.21 Although the passing of time has
proven as unfounded some perceived "threats" to the United States (such as the threat
of immigrant labor causing rampant U.S. unemployment),22 concerns remain. Returning
concerns deal with (1) border security,23 (2) anger over continued illegal and undocu-
mented immigration2 4 (3) fear of mass migration of Mexico's poorest and least-skilled
citizens,25 and (4) the fact that Mexican migrants, due to essentially ethnic differences,
would simply have a more noticeable affect on the U.S. way of life.26 These "[d]ifferences
of class, culture, language, and physical appearance" were factors leading to the United
States' historic nonacceptance of Mexican migration.27 These same factors continue to
make Mexican migration a politically contentious issue even today. Lingering stereo-
types of Mexicans still infect the U.S. perspective, and generate resistance to Mexican
immigration. 2' The events of September 11, 2001, have added new, immediate, and even
17. Id.
18. Id.; see also, Kevin R. Johnson, Symposium: Understanding the Treaty of Guadalupe Hildalgo
on its 150th Anniversary, An Essay on Immigration, Citizenship, and U.S./Mexico Relations: The
Tale of Two Treaties, 5 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 121, 127 (1998) [hereinafter "Two Treaties"]
(stating, "Clearly, in negotiating... NAFTA, Mexico possessed much less leverage than the
United States.').
19. See Amy Borrus & Geri Smith, Spotlight on the Border, BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 10, 2001.
(union leaders view Mexican immigration positively); see generally Deborah Ramirez, Immi-
gration Backlash Won't Buy Us Security, S. FLORIDA SUN SENTINEL, Oct. 6, 2001, available at
www.sun-sentinel.com/news/opinion/columnists/sfl-drcol06oct6.story. (supporting Mexican
immigration after Sept. 11 terrorist attacks).
20. James Sterngold, Legal Residency Hopes of Millions Dashed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2001, at 1A33.
21. See Herrera-Lasso, supra note 9, at 362-63; see Two Treaties, supra note 18, at 131-33.
22. See Borrus, supra note 19; Two Treaties, supra note 18, at 130.
23. See Martin, supra note 4, at 422; Orme, supra note 2, at 317.
24. See Herrera-Lasso, supra note 9, at 362-63.
25. See Two Treaties, supra note 18, at 133.
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. See Herrera-Lasso, supra note 9, at 362-63; Johnson, supra note 2, at 942 ("Although such
[illegal] immigration [from Canada] exists, it does not appear to worry most Americans.');
Johnson, supra note 2, at 951-952; Jill Norgren & Serena Nanda, Cultural Identity in the
United States: Will NAFTA Change America? in JOINING TOGETHER, STANDING APART 91, 95
(Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1997).
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more critical obstacles, such as (1) the United States' dramatic economic slowdown, and
(2) stringent, security-related immigration enforcement. 29
We have learned from the European Union (EU) experience, that dramatic strides
toward harmonization can come about in a relatively short time frame.3" While the free
movement provisions of a common market may not reach the negotiating tables for
several years, the NAFTA states should take interim steps now that will lead, irreversibly,
in that direction.
Using the EU as a reference point, this comment will examine Mexican President
Vicente Fox's vision for open borders, by comparing and contrasting NAFTAs approach
to labor migration with that of the EU solution. Next, it will consider the extent to which
cross-border migration may expand under current NAFTA provisions, and whether the
United States is amenable to such expansion. This comment will then examine whether
the amnesty and guest-worker programs proposed by the U.S. and Mexican presidents,
will be effective steps toward an open-market migration policy. Finally, this comment
will examine additional migration policy alternatives for the NAFTA states.3'
II. President Vicente Fox's Vision:
Open Trade and Open Borders
A. MEXICO'S MIGRATION AGREEMENT OVERTURES:
POSITIONING MEXICO AS THE TRUSTED ALLY
President Vicente Fox came into office thinking like an international leader, and
focused that leadership on building up Mexico as a global player.32 This focus is evi-
denced, not only by aggressively marketing labor migration plans, but by Mexico's grow-
ing influence in global affairs as well.33 President Fox is putting a new face on the
nation commonly known for its economic struggles, warring states, and second-class
status. 34 Logically, Fox decided to place major emphasis on its international relationship
with its powerful neighbor, the United States.3" The Fox initiative includes forcing the
29. James Gerstenzang & James F. Smith, Migration Issues Take Back Seat in Fox Visit, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 2001, at A24; Edward Hegstrom, Immigration Rights Now Take Back Seat, HoUSTON
CHRONICLE, Oct. 10, 2001, at A8; Sterngold, supra note 20, at IA33.
30. See Craig L. Jackson, Social Policy Harmonization and Worker Rights in the European Union:
A Model for North America? 21 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 1, 14-15 (1995) (document-
ing the rapid evolution in European cooperation-from post-war defense cooperation to
economic integration to harmonization of laws and policy).
31. While labor migration from Canada also affects U.S. migration policy, its impact, and U.S.
concern about it, does not reach the proportions of Mexican labor migration. Therefore,
this comment does not address the policies of all NAFTA states, only the United States and
Mexico.
32. Milbank, supra note 8; see Ginger Thompson, Mexico Wins U.N. Council Seat, Strengthening
Fox's World Role, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2001, at A4.
33. Thompson, supra note 32, at A4 (reporting Mexico's recent acceptance as a member in the
United Nations Security Council).
34. See Milbank, supra note 8; see David E. Sanger, Role Reversal-Fox Stands Firm on Agenda
While Bush Looks On, N.Y. TIMES NEWS SERV., Sept. 8, 2001.
35. Jose de Cordoba & Joel Millman, Mexico Charts Shifts in Relations With U.S.; Big Increase in
Visas is Sought in Return for Border Control, WALL ST. J., Jul. 7, 2000, at A8.
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United States to address immigration policy.36 In this context, Fox presents Mexico as
an attractive ally. It is with this approach that Fox created the kind of clout that allowed
the Mexican President, to show up at the White House and demand immediate changes
to U.S. immigration policy."
Rather than merely reacting to the border-enforcement approach of U.S. immi-
gration policy, Fox recognizes the migration issue as one that affects both nations.3"
Fox, therefore, seeks a bilateral agreement with the United States.39 Looking toward an
EU-styled deepening of NAFTA, Fox directs the two leaders' attention toward Mexican
migration to the United States that has occurred as a natural consequence of NAFTA.4 °
In his vision for North America, Fox would go beyond the "simple dismantling of trade
barriers" provided for by NAFTA. 41 Rather, Fox appears to aspire to a more wholly inte-
grated EU approach. 42 Therefore, according to Fox, the original outlines of NAFTA must
be expanded, allowing the continued relations between the United States and Mexico to
be built upon a system of free markets and free people.43
Throughout Fox's approach to the migration issue, the Mexican President has
emphasized to the Bush administration, that immigration proposals must reflect that
migration is an issue that affects, and requires the cooperation of, both the United
States and Mexico." Immigration is no longer just Mexico's safety valve for relieving
political and unemployment pressures.41 Rather, the United States relies on Mexican
labor migration to fulfill labor needs in countless sectors, from high-tech to domestic
help.
46
President Fox's initiative can benefit the United States in at least three ways. First,
cooperation on an issue as politically contentious as migration, will go far to build trust
between the United States and Mexico, thus strengthening relations between the two
nations. 47 Second, new policies addressing labor migration can ensure that economic
benefits the United States receives from migrant workers continue, while simultaneously
lowering the associated social costs of labor migration, and stemming the illegal immi-
gration problem. 4 Third, Mexico's cooperation with regard to immigration can provide
36. Milbank, supra note 8; see Sanger, supra note 34.
37. Milbank, supra note 8; see Sanger, supra note 34.





43. Robert L. Bartley, Thinking Things Over: Open NAFTA Borders? Why Not? WALL ST. J., July 2,
2001, at A15; Shelton, supra note 6, at A26.
44. See Milbank, supra note 8.
45. See Hearing on Immigration Policy Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on
Immigration, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Stephen Moore, Senior Fellow in Economics
Cato Institute) (describing Mexico as a "demographic safety valve" for the U.S., in which
young migrant workers' contributions to Social Security, and Medicare programs will make
up for the lost contributions of retiring baby boomers).
46. Ramirez, supra note 19; see Simons, supra note 7.
47. See generally, Herrera-Lasso, supra note 9; Office of the Press Secretary, White House Office
of Communications, Remarks by President George Bush and President Vicente Fox of Mexico
Upon Departure, available at 2001 WL 1013850 (Sept. 6, 2001.).
48. See generally Moore, supra note 10.
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a more effective, and a more cost-efficient, means of controlling migration to the United
States, than the current policy allows.49 Cooperation does, however, threaten traditional
views about U.S. national sovereignty. It requires the United States to willingly cede
some control over its own borders.5" Placing such trust in Mexico would foster the close
international relationship the Bush administration hopes to create. 51
B. THE U.S. RESPONSE: REBUILDING THE RELATIONSHIP WITH MEXICO
BASED ON TRUST AND A BILATERAL MIGRATION AGREEMENT
President Fox is fortunate to have good friend, George W. Bush, in the position to
accept and promote Fox's call to deepen NAFTA commitments. Even during the 2000
presidential campaign, George W. Bush focused America's attention on its relationship
with Mexico.5 2 Bush advocated a remake of the often-strained relationship, and played up
his good friendship with President Fox as a starting point for stronger bonds between the
nations." Upon taking office, President Bush actively pursued the goal of elevating the
U.S.-Mexican relationship on par with U.S. ties with Great Britain.54 While the NAFTA
migration issue proves to be among the most divisive President Bush has brought before
Congress, 5 the U.S. President has clearly stated his support for freer labor migration
policies: "[ijf you can make a living in America, and you can't find a job in Mexico,
family values don't stop at the southern border."56
III. The North American Free Trade Agreement:
The History of an Open Market Economy
Operating with Closed Borders
A. MODELED AFTER THE UNITED STATES-CANADIAN
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (FTA)
Before any discussion of NAFTA migration provisions, one must first look to
NAFTAs forerunner, the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA). 7 Driven
by the global trend toward creating trading blocs,5" the developed nations of the west-
ern hemisphere responded by implementing the FTA.59 "Recognizing that in a global
economy, the movement of persons across borders is critical to the movement of goods
and investment," the FTA became the first agreement under the General Agreement on
49. See Orme, supra note 2, at 318-320.
50. Id.
51. See Shelton, supra note 6, at A26; Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 47, at *2.
52. Sanger, supra note 34.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See id.; Borrus, supra note 19.
56. Borrus, supra note 19.
57. Gal-Or, supra note 3, at 369.
58. Specifically, the European Community, established by the 1957 Treaty of Rome.
59. Gal-Or, supra note 3, at 369.
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Trade and Tariffs (GATT) to address cross-border labor needs.6 0 Nonetheless, freedom
of movement rights received short shrift, addressed solely under provisions allowing
the temporary entry of particular Canadian business persons into the United States.6'
Typically, the persons identified in these provisions were highly skilled workers, trained
in specific and narrow fields. 62 The limited FTA immigration provisions became the
foundation of the NAFTA chapters twelve and sixteen. 63 Further, the member states tai-
lored the NAFTA migration policies, based on the existing immigration policies between
member-states pairs.6' Thus, the migration provisions governing U.S.-Mexican relations
erect more barriers to freedom of movement than those governing the U.S.-Canadian
relations.
65
"[W]hile NAFTA provides for a reduction of restraints on trade, with the hopes of
increasing commerce between the three nations, it... does not deal with the flow of
people between those same nations."66 Despite the novelty of drafting cross-border labor
provisions into a post-GATT agreement, the truth is, that what the NAFTA states67 set out
to accomplish was the creation of a pure trade agreement. 6' The economic liberalization
from social and national barriers just proving successful in Europe, was not to be for
NAFTA.69 Despite calls to address the immigration issues latent in the NAFTA discussion,
the prior Bush administration pushed through its purely economically minded plan. In
an obvious rejection of EU-inspired provisions, one administration official commented,
"what we are negotiating here is a trade agreement not a social contract."70
B. NAFTA: A PURE TRADE AGREEMENT
It was not just the prior Bush administration that resisted inclusion of immigration
issues. Fearing that the agreement might never be ratified with additional migration pro-
visions, Mexican President Salinas, and Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney, also fought
to keep immigration out of the agreement. Maintaining the perception that NAFTA
would only affect trade kept issues of eroding national sovereignty, from jeopardizing
enactment of the agreement. 7' Consequently, NAFTA contains no actual immigration
provisions. So while the NAFTA preamble sets forth the intent to "protect, enhance and
60. Ellen G. Yost, Immigration Provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 515 PLI/LiT.
9, 13 (1994).
61. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can, 27 I.L.M. 281, 368 art.
1501 et. seq. (1988).
62. See Yost, supra note 60, at 17.
63. Id.; Gal-Or, supra note 3, at 369.
64. Gal-Or, supra note 3, at 369.
65. See id.
66. Johnson, supra note 2, at 940-41.
67. At least the original FTA member-states.
68. See Elizabeth F. Kraus, The Systemic Effects of Economic Trade Zones on Labor Migration: The
North American Free Trade Agreement and the Lessons of the European Community, 7 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 323, 345 (1993).
69. See id. at 345-47.
70. Id. at 325.
71. See Orme, supra note 2, at 289.
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enforce basic workers' rights,"" parties to the agreement asserted nothing with regard to
workers' rights to cross member-states' borders in search of employment.73 The closest
the agreement came to broaching the issue of workers' movement across borders is in
chapter twelve74 (regarding business professionals), and chapter sixteen75 (dealing with
specific classes of skilled workers).
Chapter twelve sets forth the NAFTA governments' obligations and responsibilities
for facilitating cross-border trade in services.76 In doing so, the agreement acknowledges
that NAFTA governments must legitimize some cross-border labor movement to sup-
port the free exchange of services between the parties. Particular to labor migration
discussions, the provisions mandate that NAFTA members apply equivalent measures
in the selection and treatment of service providers,77 and in the licensing and certi-
fication of NAFTA member citizen-workers.7" Chapter twelve also encourages NAFTA
members to develop regional standards for licensing and certifying professional service
providers.79 Article 1209 of the chapter sets forth procedures for cooperation among
NAFTA members.
While chapter twelve appears to liberalize labor migration, and even advocate har-
monization at a regional level, its provisions aim only to facilitate trade, not labor migra-
tion (even temporary). First, the provisions narrowly target only service workers with
post-secondary education or similar training, leaving out the majority of workers who,
in reality, cross borders for employment.8 The provisions create no migration rights
for NAFTA-member citizens, nor immigration obligations for the NAFTA states. Rather,
article 1201.3 of this chapter firmly establishes that the provisions shall not be construed
to "impose any obligation on a Party with respect to a national of another Party seeking
access to its employment market, or employed on a permanent basis in its territory, or
to confer any right on that national with respect to that access or employment."'" These
cross-border labor provisions appear even more restrictive when read in conjunction
with chapter sixteen.
Chapter sixteen "reflects . . . the desirability of facilitating temporary entry [for busi-
ness persons] on a reciprocal basis" but governs such cross-border entry in order to
ensure the border security of NAFTA states.8 2 Article 1601 clearly conditions cross-border
movement of business persons on the continued strength of border security.8 3 Chapter
sixteen achieves these goals by setting out restricted categories of business persons that
72. The North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 296
(1994) [hereinafter NAFTAJ, at preamble.
73. See generally id. (no labor migration provisions in NAFTA).
74. Id. art. 12.01 et. seq.
75. Id. art. 16.01.
76. Id. art. 1201 et. seq.
77. Id. art. 1202-3.
78. Id. art. 1210.
79. Id. at annex 1210.5, Sec. A.
80. See Gal-Or, supra note 3, at 375-76.
81. NAFTA, supra note 72, at art 1201.3.
82. Id. art. 1601.
83. Id.
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may be temporarily admitted. 4 Even then, NAFTA states may deny entry to qualified
persons "under applicable measures relating to public health and safety, and national
security.'"" Far from facilitating a predictable system of cross-border entry, this pro-
vision allows fluctuation based on the level of security a NAFTA state requires at its
border. The most obvious example is the United States' heightened border security in
the months following the September 11 terrorist attacks. Finally, chapter sixteen dims
chances of real labor migration advances with its provision, article 1606, which, except
in extreme circumstances, prevents NAFTA states from pursuing dispute settlement pro-
ceedings available under article 2007.86
While limited, these provisions do enable NAFTA states to develop mechanisms
for facilitating the movement of workers across NAFTA borders.8 7 Although it is still
a far cry from harmonization, the United States and Mexico are closer to reconciling
disparate immigration policies with NAFTA, than they would be without it. NAFTA sets
a foundation by "requir[ing] the parties to the agreement to establish readily understood
criteria or requirements" for temporary entry "and to clearly set forth the procedures to
enable [cross-border labor movement of business professionals]:' 8
Yet, any rights created in these provisions are created solely in the context of facili-
tating trade. 9 Nowhere does NAFTA establish rights for the individual worker. Enforce-
ment mechanisms exist only for one NAFTA state against another, providing individual
NAFTA citizens no recourse against discrimination.9" Even among NAFTA states the
agreement limits remedies for noncompliance to reciprocal arrangements. For instance,
"[flailure by a NAFTA government to comply with [the elimination of licensing resi-
dence requirements, as set out in article 1210] does not give rise to recourse under the
dispute settlement procedures. Rather, the governments may respond by maintaining, or
reinstating, equivalent residency requirements in the relevant sector' 91 Before NAFTA
can confer freedom of movement rights on individual NAFTA citizens, it must first move
toward greater state-to-state harmonization of policy.
C. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND NAFTA
Even as a pure trade agreement, many critics argue that NAFTA should have pro-
moted the free movement of labor as well as trade.9 2 Then why were migration issues
isolated from NAFTA? Migration, particularly from Mexico, has long been a thorny
issue in U.S. politics due to the on-going illegal immigration problem.93 The relative
84. Id. at app. 1603.D.1.
85. Id. art. 1603.
86. Id. art. 1606.
87. See Gal-Or, supra note 3, at 374.
88. Harry J. Joe, Temporary Entry of Business Persons to the United States Under the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 391, 414 (1994).
89. NAFTA, supra note 72, at art. 1601.
90. Id. art. 1201.3.
91. NAFTA Chapter 12 Implementation Act, available at 1993 WL 561160 (N.A.F.T.A.), *4
(NAFTA).
92. Johnson, supra note 2, at 964; See generally McNary, supra note 3, at 247.
93. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 961; See Two Treaties, supra note 18, at 122-23.
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permanence of people (as opposed to mere trade) moving across NAFTA borders cre-
ates the impression of a more lasting impact on a nation-a tampering with "national
identity.""9
Fundamentally, migration control systems between nations grapple with an issue
that nations formerly dealt with unilaterally-concerned only with migration's impact
domestically.95 The United States did not stand alone in its unwillingness to cede this
control; under NAFTA absolutely no migration obligations dilute national sovereignty."
Each country maintains complete control over migration affecting its borders.97 "Despite
the United States and Mexico's refusal to address the relationship between trade and
migration issues, continuing tension between NAFTA's free trade goals, and the United
States restrictionist immigration policies eventually might result in the relaxation of
restraints on migration from Mexico."98 As discussed in Part V of this paper, the realities
of promoting free trade, as well as the influence of private industry, have expanded
the level of cross-border labor movement originally anticipated by NAFTA negotiators.
These developments likely pave the way for migration policy relaxation, which is, at the
time of this writing, being debated between the United States and Mexico. Ultimately,
this should lead to amendments to NAFTA that embrace an EU-inspired approach to
labor mobility. This supports the theory that NAFTA negotiators actually intended that
migration policy changes would be led by market demands, not, as with the EU, by
politicians.99
IV. The EU Model in Comparison: Integration,
Harmonization and Free Movement
A. INAUsPICIOUs BEGINNINGS: IT ALL BEGAN WITH A TRADE AGREEMENT
Despite the limited scope of initial negotiations, NAFTA is actually tracking along
the same early development stages as the EU-model.' ° The European experience in
integration developed through a two-step process, defined as initial negative integration
followed by positive integration.'0 ' Negative integration involves the removal of national
economic rules and policies that hinder trade among the member-nations.' 2 Positive
94. Johnson, supra note 2, at 968-69.
95. Christopher W. Rudolph, Globalization, Sovereignty, and Migration: A Conceptual Framework,
3 UCLA. J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 325, 339 (1998).
96. See Orme, supra note 2, at 288 (indicating that the loss of unilateral border control is just
one of many perceived challenges to national sovereignty: "Canadians and Mexicans are even
warier. A continental common market can sound unnervingly like a United States of North
America, with Washington as its unchallenged capital.")
97. NAFTA, supra note 72, at art. 1601.
98. Johnson, supra note 2, at 943.
99. Gal-Or, supra note 3, at 374.
100. Orme, supra note 2, at 299.
101. See John P. Fitzpatrick, The Future of the North American Free Trade Agreement: A Comparative
Analysis of the Role of Regional Economic Institutions and the Harmonization of Law in North
America and Western Europe, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 20 (1996).
102. Id.
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integration involves affirmative steps by the member-nations to "transfer [the] public
market-rule-making and policy-making powers from the participating polities to the
union level." 3 It is at this second step, positive integration, that the EU model illustrates
where NAFTA needs to develop next." Positive integration involves the creation of
common institutions, with the power to managing competing member-nation policies,
such as immigration."' 5
B. MIGRATION AND THE EU MODEL
Labor migration formed an integral part of the EU agreement from the start.
10 6
The EU was built on achieving economic objectives, as was NAFTA. 10 7 But unlike
the NAFTA states, members of the EU founded a single economic market that went
beyond providing for the freedom of trade; the EU also provided for the freedom of
movement of persons."0 ' The Treaty Establishing the European Community, as mod-
ified by the Treaty of Amsterdam, provides the following foundation for migration
issues in the EU: "Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the
Community."'"
With those words the more developed, more prosperous members of the EU imme-
diately became open to large migration influx. Yet, this expansive language is governed,
controlled, and shaped by the supranational institutions that the treaty created simul-
taneously with these rights.l 0 This governing structure, composed of the Council, the
Commission, the Parliament, and the European Court of Justice, works as a federalist
EU government overlaying national governments of the EU member states."' The EU's
governing structure has the task of "forging an all-encompassing political identity out
of numerous sovereign states.""' Although NAFTA does not bear the burden of devel-
oping a complete social harmonization and economic integration program, a review of
the EU governing institutions serves as a helpful backdrop to our discussion of NAFTA's
supranational mechanisms.
103. Id. (quoting Jacques Pelkmans, The Institutional Economics of European Integration, in 1
INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE 318, 321
(Maurio Cappelletti et al. eds., 1986).
104. See Kraus, supra note 68, at 357.
105. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 101, at 23-24.
106. Jackson, supra note 30, at 15.
107. Id.
108. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES ESTAB-
LISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997, O..
(340) arts. 39-48, (1997) [hereinafter "TREATY OF AMSTERDAM"]; Jackson, supra note 30,
at 15.
109. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM art. 39.
110. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM arts. 249-280; see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 101, at 24-29; Jackson,
supra note 30, at 16-18. Fitzpatrick's article provides a clear, comprehensive guide to the
federalist structure and institutions of the EU.
111. Fitzpatrick, supra note 101, at 11; Jackson, supra note 30, at 19.
112. Jackson, supra note 30, at 16.
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1. The Council
The Council, which came into being as recently as 1974,113 now stands at the head of
the governing structure, serving as the principal legislative body of the EU.' 4 It decides
which of the Commission's legislative proposals will become law."' The Council's task
is to "ensure that the objectives set out in this Treaty are attained..1. 6 In doing so,
the Council also "sets the agenda and establishes the basic framework for all policies"',
7
In keeping with its federalist structure, the Council's exercise of its task is kept in check,
since it cannot pass legislation except as proposed by the Commission.
2. The Commission
The Commission "operates as the [European] Community's executive branch;" ' 8
although the Council directs the Commission's agenda." 9 Exercising its duty "to act
in the general interest of the European Union [EU]," the Commission "initiates spe-
cific proposals for community norms."'20 This proposed legislation goes to the Council,
which may later issue the legislation in the form of regulations, directives, or deci-
sions.1 21 The law-making mechanism of the directive relies on the EU member states
for enforcement-the directive must be enacted through the national legislation of each
member state. But under the Treaty of Rome, the Council has the authority to trans-
form the Commission's proposals into Community law by "issu[ing] directives for the
approximation of such provisions laid down by law, regulation, or administrative action
in member states, as directly affect the establishment of the Common Market" 22
3. The Parliament
Although the European Parliament was designed to serve the democratic role of a
traditional parliament, it remains the least powerful of the EU institutions.123 As a result
of the EU's perceived need for greater democracy in the governing structure, however,
the Parliament's authority now extends to the approval of legislation, and the input of
information into the legislative process. 2 4 Parliament can now "initiate the legislative
process by requesting legislative proposals from the Commission on matters that [the
Parliament] considers appropriate for implementing the treaty."'125
113. Fitzpatrick, supra note 101, at 26.
114. Jackson, supra note 30, at 16.
115. Id.
116. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM art. 202.
117. Fitzpatrick, supra note 101, at 27.
118. Id. at 26.
119. Jackson, supra note 30, at 16.
120. Fitzpatrick, supra note 101, at 26.
121. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM art. 189; Jackson, supra note 30, at 16.
122. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM art. 94.
123. Fitzpatrick, supra note 101, at 27.
124. See TREATY OF AMSTERDAM arts. 249-252; see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 101, at 27-28.
125. Jackson, supra note 30, at 16.
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4. The European Court of Justice (ECI)
As expected in a federalist structure, it is ultimately judicial enforcement that
empowers the Council's authority to issue directives. 26 The ECJ plays a critical role in
governing EU labor migration policies.'27 The ECJ may hear actions brought by member
states alleging failure of another state to fulfill obligations under the treaty. 2 '
Additionally, the ECJ plays another dynamic role in shaping labor migration
throughout the EU. Under article 234, the ECJ has jurisdiction to give preliminary
rulings concerning the interpretation of the Treaty, as well as of legislation established
by the Council. 129 With this authority, the ECJ granted EU citizens a power unheard of
in NAFTA states-its interpretation of Council Directive 64/221 ensured that individual
citizens may defend their rights as EU citizens in the member states' national courts. 3 °
When legislative process of the EU Council and Commission cannot keep pace
with the quickly evolving nature of labor migration interests in the EU, the ECJ plays
a powerful role in providing gap-filling policies.' 3' Frequently, the ECJ's policy-making
decisions extend the scope of Council Directives on labor migration. 3 2 Thus, the ECJ is
an example of the great power that may rest with an EU supranational institution.
C. COMPARISON WITH NAFTA
1. Differences
In strict contrast to the EU, none of the NAFTA institutions have authority to
harmonize or modify existing law.'33 "In addition, the NAFTA does not create a judicial,
or monitoring, institution to ensure the uniform interpretation and enforcement of legal
norms relevant to regional commerce" 34 let alone labor migration.'35 Essentially, NAFTA
institutions lack the federalist authority that allows the EU institutions to direct and
enforce community law.
The NAFTA institutions are intentionally weak. "Many of the differences between
the European and North American systems are associated with a clear unwillingness by
the contracting parties to NAFTA, to surrender their sovereignty over sensitive political
issues:' namely immigration. 3 6 Not only does NAFTA limit mention of worker mobility
126. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 101, at 73.
127. Kraus, supra note 68, at 329.
128. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM art. 227.
129. Id. at 234.
130. Case 41/74, Yvonne Van Duyn v. Home Office 1974 E.C.R 1337; Kraus, supra note 68, at 330.
131. Id. at 329.
132. Id. at 334.
133. See generally, NAFTA, supra note 72; see Fitzpatrick, supra note 101, at 7; see also Part III of
this comment, supra. The fact that no NAFTA supranational institution has the authority to
impose modifications on the NAFTA states' existing national legislation, is consistent with the
NAFTA states' concerns about national sovereignty, as indicated by their refusal to address
immigration or labor migration in NAFTA.
134. Fitzpatrick, supra note 101, at 7.
135. See id. at 14-15.
136. Id.
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to very specific, narrow provisions, it expressly excludes any reference to the free move-
ment of persons.1
7
2. Similarities: Adopting External Controls
Often forgotten in NAFTA evaluations is the fact that NAFTA has introduced supra-
national, or in other words, external controlling mechanisms to the triparte relationship
of the NAFTA states.'38 The Environmental Side Agreement to NAFTA established a
Commission comprising of a Council, a Secretariat, and a Joint Public Advisory Commit-
tee, charged with creating and implementing rules, and promoting enforcement through
the power to suspend benefits to member-nations.'
Some critics correctly point out that the NAFTA Side Agreements are merely an
attempt to foster economic integration, without the risk of ceding control to suprana-
tional institutions. 4 Yet, critics must concede that the Side Agreements do subject poli-
cies of the member-nations to the scrutiny of their NAFTA peers, and are thus a critical
first step toward achieving greater integration and, ultimately, policy harmonization. 4 '
3. Similarities: Resistance to Integration
Contrary to what most U.S. citizens likely believe, "European societies did not inte-
grate quickly or harmoniously"" ' One can now take for granted the existence of the
present-day EU, with wide-open borders and a single currency. Yet, in the not-so-distant
past, the EU was divided among the integration-minded European Community states,
and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states, that desired nothing beyond a free
trade area and rejected any perceived encroachments on their national sovereignty."'
Instructive to the NAFTA experience, EFTA eventually gave way to integration initiatives,
eradicating the early stumbling block to the EU harmonization.' Still, even as recently
137. Id.
138. See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, Can.-Mex.-
U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1480, 1485-1489 [hereinafter Environmental Side Agreement].
139. Id.
140. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 101, at 16.
141. See generally, Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 138; see Orme, supra note 2, at 297.
Through articles 8, 9, 11, and 21, the Environmental Side Agreement clearly establishes a
supranational Council, and Secretariat which may require NAFTA states to provide informa-
tion for the purpose of evaluating NAFTA states' compliance with the agreement. Article 27
authorizes the creation of a supranational panel with the power to discipline NAFTA states
who have violated the agreement. While NAFTA states have broad latitude within the bounds
of the Environmental Side Agreement, the very self-imposed limitations to which each NAFTA
state agreed draws the divergent policies of the NAFTA states closer in line. The Environmen-
tal Side Agreement forms the beginning of environmental policy harmonization and works
as a model for policy harmonization in other areas of concern to the NAFTA states.
142. Martin Heisler, Contextualizing Global Migration: Sketching the Socio-Political Landscape in
Europe, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 557, 577 (1998).
143. Fitzpatrick, supra note 101, at 38.
144. Id.
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as 2000, resistance to the introduction of a common currency, the euro, has demon-
strated that the struggle between harmonization and national sovereignty continues. 4 '
Like the original member states of the European Free Trade Associations (EFTA),
the members of NAFTA displayed a strong unwillingness to cede national sovereignty
to a regional organization. 46 Other similarities include a general history of distrusting
foreigners and subjecting newcomers to prejudicial treatment. 147 "First foreign workers,
then migrants in general, came to occupy the lower rungs vacated by native workers on
the social, as well as economic status ladders. Due to their low status, in class terms,
host societies looked down on migrants.' 14 Just as with U.S. stereotypes of Mexicans,
most Europeans felt justified in their biases against foreign workers, since many migrants
came from low economic, social, and educational backgrounds. 49
To put into perspective the NAFTA states' resistance to more comprehensive inte-
gration, it is important to remember "that the EFTA countries in the early stages of
European economic integration, did not anticipate the degree of integration existing
today."' That NAFTA states rejected many facets of the EU model does not rule out
the possibility that similar supranational institutions will be necessary for the future
development of NAFTA and North American economic growth.'
V. Why Its Time to Supplement NAFTA:
Arguments for Integration
A. OPEN TRADE INEVITABLY LEADS TO OPEN BORDERS:
ECONOMISTS VIEW LABOR MIGRATION AS NECESSARY
TO ACHIEVING NAFTAs OBJECTIVES
The NAFTA states negotiated to open their borders for trade, seeking to increase
commerce and economic growth between the three nations.5 2 Considering the fact that
much of this trade could deal with the flow of service products across borders, it seems
almost irresponsible that NAFTA failed to address the flow of workers across NAFTA
states' borders.' 3 Economists point to the inescapable connection between trade and
migration issues, and question whether the NAFTA states can sustain the tension between
free trade objectives, and restrictionist immigration policies.5 4 Further, they question
why such policies are even desirable in today's global climate. 5 Unlike its western suc-
cessor, the European Community faced immigration issues head-on.5 6 Having dealt with
145. Alan Cowell, Britain Winces Over Denmark's Rejection of the Euro, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2000,
at A.
146. Fitzpatrick, supra note 101, at 12-13.
147. Heisler, supra note 142, at 571-72.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 572.
150. Fitzpatrick, supra note 101, at 13.
151. See id.
152. Johnson, supra note 2, at 940-41.
153. See id.
154. Id. at 942.
155. See McNary, supra note 3, at 247; Two Treaties, supra note 18, at 134.
156. See Jackson, supra note 30, at 13-15.
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mass movements of workers ever since World War II, the EU members acknowledged
the trade-migration nexus and incorporated agreement provisions that allowed migra-
tion of labor between EU member nations. I5 7 If the success currently enjoyed in the EU
is not enough to convince U.S. policy-makers, studies suggest that the economic benefits
of removing immigration barriers could easily exceed the gains won by removing trade
barriers.' Pointing to the ways in which market demands have already shaped NAFTA's
common market, one labor migration supporter says, "[flifty years from now NAFTA
could be seen as the start of a new phase of North American economic expansion."15 9
B. SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
Migration involves much more than economic gain, however. It is an issue that runs
deep into the American psyche."6 Therefore, consideration of whether the United States
mainstream society will accept liberalized labor migration, makes this issue just as much
about public policy as it is about globalization. 6' It follows that making changes in U.S.
immigration policy is just as much about winning over Congress, as it is winning over
the U.S. executive branch.'62 While the argument for a liberalized migration policy still
attracts plenty of critics, the overall public response is receptive. 63
At the turn of the century, critics said that Italians and east Europeans would never become
Americans. Today, the same arguments are made against Latinos, Asians, and other immi-
grants. Behind the rhetoric, the critics' arguments boil down to this: Immigrants aren't good
enough to join us, and America is not strong enough to absorb them. History teaches us that
nothing could be more wrong.' 6'
The reasons for this are three-fold: social, political, and economic. First, as NAFTA
opened the United States to increased trade with Mexico, it also brought knowledge of
Mexican culture closer to the average U.S. citizen. 65 As we have learned from the EU, as
migrants assimilate, these social and cultural differences gradually become absorbed or
accepted by their new communities.' 66 During the process, the once threatening stranger
becomes an indispensable neighbor. Second, Mexican-Americans now make up a sig-
nificant segment of U.S. citizens and voters, 167 a demographic shift that has not gone
157. See TREATY OF AMSTERDAM arts. 39-42; Jackson, supra note 30, at 13-15; see Two Treaties,
supra note 18, at 131.
158. Chang, supra note 3, at 373.
159. Orme, supra note 2, at 315.
160. Hearing on Immigration Policy, supra note 45, (statement of U.S. Senator Sam Brownback,
Committee Chairman); see Herrera-Lasso, supra note 9, at 363 (1998).
161. See Herrera-Lasso, supra note 9, at 363.
162. Sanger, supra note 34.
163. See generally Bartley, supra note 43 (recognizing that the Wall Street Journal, among others,
supports President Fox's vision for free movement of persons).
164. Hearing on Immigration Policy, supra note 45.
165. See Orme, supra note 2, at 313.
166. See Bartley, supra note 43.
167. Gary Martin, Trial Balloon on Amnesty Shot Down, SAN ANTONIO EXPREss-NEws, July 21,
2001, available at I 1C2001 WL 24769645; Bush to Consider Residency for All Immigrants,
WALL ST. J., July 27, 2001, at A2.
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unnoticed by political candidates from both the Democratic and Republican parties.'
61
These voters will continue to highlight immigration issues in American politics. 69 Third,
and most importantly, the United States still needs Mexican workers. 70 As baby boomers
retire and the number of dual-income households increase, the need for workers in
the service sector will require economic migrants from the United States' southern
neighbor.''
Despite the recent hike in U.S. unemployment rates, foreign labor remains vital to
the U.S. economy.'72 In 2001, the 27.6 million legal immigrants produced approximately
10 percent of the nation's Gross Domestic Product. 173 Undocumented immigrants, num-
bering roughly six million, produced still more.
174
Regardless of recent economic downturns, the American public does not appear
threatened by the thought of migrant workers. 175 When a Los Angeles security guard
recently commented, "[t] here are so many jobs that most Americans don't want to do:'
he echoed a widely held opinion. 176 Economists argue that there is plenty of work to go
around for migrants. 177 In fact, by taking jobs in the unskilled labor segment, "immi-
grants free up natives, allowing them to be employed in more specialized production."'1 78
Most Americans would agree. Furthermore, many would acknowledge that they rely on
Mexican labor in their everyday lives. 179
Economist and Senior Fellow in economics at the Cato Institute Stephen Moore
echoes the consensus economists have arrived at over the last fifteen to twenty years-
"immigrants are.., on balance, good for the economy." 8 ° Mr. Moore's studies show that
labor migration from Mexico was helping to neutralize the economic imbalance caused
as aging baby boomers leaving the workforce stop contributing to, and start drawing
from, programs such as Social Security and Medicare.' Despite the costs associated
with immigration, statistics show that the United States nets a benefit. 82 The reason
for this is most Mexicans migrate to the United States in their mid-twenties, and they
168. Bush to Consider Residency, supra note 166, at A2; see also Jeff Zeleny, A Worried GOP Learning
Spanish, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 21, 2002.
169. Martin, supra note 164.
170. Orme, supra note 2, at 316-17; Ramirez, supra note 19; Simons, supra note 7.
171. Ramirez, supra note 19.
172. Simons, supra note 7.
173. id.
174. Id.
175. Borrus, supra note 19.
176. Id.; Shelton, supra note 6, at A26 (quoting President Bush's observation that Mexican migrants
are "willing to walk across miles of desert to do work that some American's won't do").
177. Simons, supra note 7.
178. DR. RAUL HINOJOSA OJEDA ET. AL., COMPREHENSIVE MIGRATION POLICY REFORM IN NORTH
AMERICA: THE KEY TO SUSTAINABLE AND EQUITABLE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 17 (North
American Integration and Development Center, UCLA School of Public Policy and Social
Research, Working Paper No. 12, Aug. 29. 2001), available at naid.sppsr.ucla.edu/.
179. See Ramirez, supra note 19.
180. Hearing on Immigration Policy, supra note 45,
181. Id.
182. See Moore, supra note 10; Ojeda, supra note 175, at 22.
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come primarily to work. During migrants' working lives in the United States, the U.S.
economy reaps the benefit of their payroll taxes without the cost of educating these
adults. 183 Admittedly, these migrant workers may collect from the programs when they
retire, but economists have found that the costs are more than repaid after migrants'
children enter the workforce.'84 After decades of being the economic safety valve for
Mexico, economists are recognizing the United States has a "demographic safety valve"
in the Mexican migrants who arrive here to work.'85
C. THE COSTS OF CONTROL
Contrary to the economic benefits of immigration, the U.S. border control policy
exerts a considerable pull on the federal budget.'86 The United States' long-standing
response to controlling illegal labor migration has been to spend more money militariz-
ing the border with additional agents and high-tech apprehension gear.187 Its effectiveness
is highly criticized 8 and attacked by some as counterproductive.' 9 In fact, migrants'
experiences reinforce that position. 90 As risks involved with border crossing rise, some
would-be temporary migrants, intending to work in the United States for just a few
years, find that the perils of border-crossing present too great a deterrent to leaving. 19'
Rather than risking their lives or the possibility of apprehension, migrants decide that it
is safer to continue living unobtrusively in the United States.
Additionally, increasingly aggressive border smuggling rings counter the effective-
ness of restrictive border control expenditures.'92 Along with a rise in the price hopeful
migrants are willing to pay for border crossing,193 the costs in human lives has also
soared.'94 Between October 1997 and June of 2001, at least 1,013 migrants died attempt-
ing to cross the border. 195 Consequently, many blame the United States for human rights
violations occurring as a result of restrictive U.S. border control.' 96
183. Hearing on Immigration Policy, supra note 45; Moore, supra note 10.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Martin, supra note 4, at 432.
187. Id. at 422.
188. Id.; de Cordoba, supra note 26, at A8.
189. Martin, supra note 4, at 422-23; Orme, supra note 2, at 317-18.
190. See generally Alfredo Corchado, Immigrants' Road to Prosperity Becoming a One-Way Route
North, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 1, 2001, at 1A, available at 2001 WL 26643224 (report-
ing the stories of individual "temporary" migrants).
191. Id.; see Martin, supra note 4, at 422-23; Orme, supra note 2, at 317-18.
192. Ojeda, supra note 175, at 5.
193. Id. at 32 (noting that illegal entry with the aid of smugglers currently costs between $1,000
and $2,500).
194. Hernan Rozemberg, Illegal-Migrant Border Arrests Fall Drastically, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Oct. 10,
2001, available at arizonarepublic.com.
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2001 (Eliza Hughes, trans.), available at thenewsmexico.com.
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The current U.S. immigration control policy is endemic of the U.S. government's
misunderstanding of immigration today.9 7 Before innovations in transportation and
communications, "transnational migration usually entailed a single, massive, life-altering
decision"" Now, technology has lowered the costs of globalization on the individ-
ual scale, virtually erasing borders and rendering migration policies obsolete.' 99 These
same technological advances have "rais[ed] the costs or difficulties of effectively manag-
ing migration and chang[ed] the cost-benefit balance sheet of efforts to attain national
objectives autonomously." ' Statistics support this view. Research shows that while the
United States has nearly tripled the number of INS border patrol agents in the south-
west sector since 1993, the annual rate of apprehension has remained relatively flat.20'
In light of these changes wrought by globalization trends, border control by means of
bilateral agreement certainly appears to be a timely goal. In addition to lowering border
control costs, Mexican initiatives to create a U.S.-Mexico border council would support
the United States' recently heightened security goals. 202
VI. Interim Steps: Analysis and Recommendations
A. CURRENT PROPOSALS: AMNESTY AND THE GUEST-WORKER PROGRAM
While both President Bush and President Fox embrace the concept of a guest worker
program as a way to handle economic migration, the issue nonetheless remains con-
tentious in Congress.20 3 Proponents of the plan argue that a guest-worker program will
control a legal flow of immigrants, fulfill U.S. labor needs and create only temporary
migration effects on U.S. communities.20 4 Opponents counter that a guest-worker pro-
gram will only spur more illegal immigration, suffer the noncompliance of U.S. com-
panies with regard to restricting hiring to a guest-worker labor pool, and saddle U.S.
communities with "temporary" workers who will, in fact, become permanent residents.
20 5
The current proposals have numerous critics, not the least of which favor no expan-
sion of U.S.-Mexican migration at all. 206 Critics portray the amnesty solution as unfair to
197. See Leah Haus, Integrated Issues: Migration and International Economic Interdependence, in
FREE MARKETS, OPEN SOCIETIES, CLOSED BORDERS? TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
AND IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE AMERICAS 85, 89.(Max I. Castro, ed., 1999).
198. Heisler, supra note 142, at 562.
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201. Ojeda, supra note 175, at 18 & Fig. 4.
202. Jerry Kammer, Mexican Officials Lobby for Border Issues in Washington, ARIz. REPUBLIC,
Jan. 24, 2002, available at arizonarepublic.com.
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Aug. 27, 2001)
204. Martin, supra note 4, at 437.
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in response to the September 11 attacks on the United States).
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the thousands of would-be immigrants who arrived in the United States legally, and as
effectively encouraging illegal migration by rewarding lawbreakers." 7 The guest-worker
proposal is beset with concerns that temporary workers will never leave the United States
once here, and that the government has no effective means of tracking guest-workers.
20 8
Politics aside, the current proposals do not go far enough to address long-term conflicts
and costs to the United States to enforce these immigration measures.
Furthermore, these proposals fail to address the fact that the U.S. economy requires a
consistent flow of labor migration into the United States. 20 9 Neither a one-time amnesty,
nor a limited guest-worker program, will change traditional migration control policies.
210
Only by getting to the root of United States-Mexico migration may policy-makers find a
solution. Current immigration control measures do not take into account the labor "pull"
that the higher wages and availability of service sector jobs, in the United States exerts on
employment-seeking Mexicans.2 11 "[F]lows of capital and labor highlight factors other
than border-control measures that influence migration."2 2 If, under the current propos-
als, amnesty affects just workers in certain industries, the number of guest-visas would
be limited to a specific, government-controlled positions and a substantial migration
flow would remain. 21 3 Therefore, it is doubtful that either the amnesty or guest-worker
concepts will have much effect on the overall migration problem.
21 4
Given the treacherous dynamics of border crossing, opponents of the guest-worker
program could be correct in assuming such a program will result in new permanent res-
idents from Mexico.21 1 Under the current U.S. immigration scheme, a guest-worker pro-
gram cannot operate effectively.216 The primary reason for this is the militantly guarded
U.S. border with Mexico. 2 7 As long as the United States manages the immigration issue
through sheer force in the form of border patrols, free movement of some workers, but
not others, cannot exist.
B. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
As politically exciting as the amnesty and guest-worker proposals may appear at
present, their effects are too limited to spur any real change for U.S.-Mexican labor
migration.218 Based on the discussion above, there are at least two alternatives U.S.
and Mexican policy-makers may pursue: (1) negotiate a true bilateral migration agree-
ment between the two NAFTA states, which encompasses a broad worker visa program
207. All Things Considered, supra note 202; Sanger, supra note 34.
208. See de Cordoba, supra note 35; see Martin, supra note 4, at 437.
209. Hearing on Immigration Policy, supra note 45, (statement of Stephen Moore, Senior Fellow in
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216. Id.
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and shared responsibility for enforcing the agreement, or (2) commence talks toward
achieving migration policy harmonization through the creation of an EU-styled feder-
alist governing structure, adopted and supported by all three NAFTA states in the form
of a Labor Migration Side Agreement. Each alternative may be explored independently.
However, considering the deliberations between the United States and Mexico are on-
going, a United States-Mexico bilateral migration agreement serves as a logical starting
point for a future NAFTA Labor Migration Side Agreement.
1. United States-Mexico Bilateral Migration Agreement
The United States and Mexico started strong in their commitment to bilateral agree-
ment earlier in 2001.219 While the guest-worker program could be one product of such
cooperation, a more lasting agreement should embrace an open-border labor migra-
tion program. This program could be designed to continue and enhance the benefits
of migrant labor to the United States, while minimizing the accompanying social costs.
The United States can achieve this outcome by simply "legaliz[ing] the free labor mar-
ket that currently functions so efficiently,' while avoiding the burdensome government
intervention associated with a unilateral guest-worker program. 20 By legalizing current
undocumented Mexican labor migration levels (historically 300,000 annually),221 the
United States would place itself in a position, along with Mexico, to govern the terms of
the migration.
While the U.S.-Mexican labor migration issue focuses almost exclusively on Mexican
migration to the United States, the nations' bilateral migration agreement can reinforce
the foreign policy element of the agreement by including a reciprocity provision for U.S.
citizens.222 Although this agreement should promote two-way labor traffic, the United
States could insist upon stopgap measures that would allow the United States to manage
migration inflows. The first measure would be to issue a large number of work visas
(based on current migrant inflow), in order to make illegal immigration an unattractive
option for migrant hopefuls.223 This control measure should allow the United States
to reduce its spending on border control. Next, the United States can make issuance
of work visas contingent upon labor demands and/or the ability of a migrant to find
employment.2 4 This would provide the nations an objective standard for determining
whether to periodically modify visa numbers upward or downward.
In order to enhance the economic benefits to the United States, the government
could impose entry fees competitive with fee smugglers charge for illegal entry.2 1
This would place authorized U.S. entry within reach of migrants, who clearly come to
the United States for better employment opportunities, while discouraging would-be
migrants, who lack serious employment motives. 226 The United States could use the fees
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generated by the program to help fund enhanced monitoring systems.227 Monitoring
could include migrants' income tax payment record, employment status and criminal
record-all areas that could lead to forfeiture of a migrant's work visa.
Another critical U.S. goal is minimizing the social costs to those involved with migra-
tion. By "legalizing" current Mexican migration levels, Mexico can insist that Mexican
migrants become eligible for the work-related programs, such as social security, into
which migrants currently contribute.228 In return, the United States will be in a position
to demand that migrants pay personal income tax, and restrict migrants' eligibility to
means-based rights such as Medicare.
229
For the United States, an agreement such as the one detailed above legitimizes the
reality of Mexican labor migration into the United States. Therefore, it represents little
additional burden. For Mexico, the agreement represents an increase of burden propor-
tionate to the benefits it provides Mexican citizens. Mainly, under such an agreement
Mexico would take on substantial responsibility for securing its northern border with
the United States. 230 This burden has become even more critical considering U.S. height-
ened national security concerns. Border control responsibility would also entail greater
border control measures on Mexico's southern borders, in order to prevent Mexico from
becoming a highway for illegal migrant inflows from Latin America.
231
A final issue the United States and Mexico should consider, are provisions for eval-
uation and modification of the agreement. Such a program could provide for regular
evaluation by the countries to determine whether liberalized labor movement is, in fact,
providing mutual benefit to the nations. The agreement may also set a renegotiation
deadline in order to address issues, such as migrants' social and residency rights.
With the two nations sharing an ownership interest in enforcing the agreement
policy, this cooperative could lift the heavy burden of border enforcement from the
United States.23 2 Both nations could benefit socially and economically from the partner-
ship. Moreover, cooperation on the immediate issue of migration, could lead to future
harmonization efforts after the style of the EU.233 Ultimately, harmonization, beginning
with bilateral migration control, would mark a new era in the U.S.-Mexican foreign
relations.
2. Labor Migration Side Agreement
A U.S.-Mexico migration agreement may, but need not, be the precursor to an actual
NAFTA addendum-the Labor Migration Side Agreement. As experienced in the EU, free
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persons, in turn, incrementally presses member nations toward harmonization of migra-
tion policy. The United States could benefit greatly from harmonizing its immigration
policy with its NAFTA partners-primarily Mexico. The EU provides a model governing
structure for achieving that benefit.
However, noting that the EU structure was developed to achieve far greater integra-
tion goals, the model must be modified to NAFTA purposes. Just as the EU model pro-
vides a federalist structure of supranational authority, the Environmental Side Agreement
has provided examples of how NAFTA institutions may take on expanded supranational
authority. By adopting and expanding the Environmental Side Agreement framework,
NAFTA states may establish institutions for governing a NAFTA labor migration policy.
This separate side agreement for labor migration could be the first step towards achieving
larger, EU-styled harmonization objectives.
So how do we get from here to harmonization? First, NAFTA states' migration
policies could be designed to gradually increase the annual level of labor migration across
NAFTA borders. Such policies may follow the United States-Mexico Migration Agreement
discussed above.
Second, following the example of the Environmental Side Agreement, the Labor
Migration Side Agreement would establish common institutions. The power of these
mechanisms would extend beyond that granted in the Environmental Side Agreement.
Rather than serve as a mere clearing-house for evaluating migration policy performance,
the institutions created by a Labor Migration Side Agreement would begin the process
of positive integration by transferring the market-driven powers of policy-making to a
governable supranational level. The new NAFTA institutions would have authority to
impose actual penalties on NAFTA states that fail to meet their obligations, legislate
remedies for such failures, as well as impose compliance through directives. These insti-
tutions could take on the features of a federal governing structure that may guide NAFTA
states toward policy harmonization.
Third, once NAFTA states succeed in integrating migration policies, the members
could create a tripartite NAFTA court of migration, to govern the enforcement of such
policies. Naturally, this court would reflect the goals and national sovereignty concerns
of the NAFTA states. To begin with, the judicial authority of this "court" would not
replicate the interpretive power of the ECJ. Rather, its function would be limited, as to
authority in a manner consistent with, but likely exceeding, the judicial mechanisms of
the Environmental Side Agreement. A NAFTA court would not have the "gap-filling"
legislative power of the ECJ.
Many advances in EU integration, however, occurred as a result of the deep inter-
pretive power of the ECJ.235 Therefore, to compensate for a less-influential NAFTA court,
the NAFTA institutions created in this side agreement will need to develop a legisla-
tive agenda. The agenda would include timelines for negotiating the further progress of
migration harmonization. Legislative issues may include social policy, citizenship, worker
health and safety, equal opportunity employment, and the extension of rights to workers'
families.
235. Kraus, supra note 68, at 329.
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VII. Conclusion
The EU has repeatedly exemplified that open trade and open borders were meant
to be inseparable.236 As a vindication for its supporters, the labor migration issue that
should have always been a part of NAFTA refused to disappear. Now, the United States
and Mexico have returned to the bargaining table to deal with the issue. Hopefully, this
will be done in a way that has lasting positive implications for all of North America.
The market demands that NAFTA negotiators were so concerned with, have spoken up
in favor of labor migration.
Then how does the United States and Mexico move ahead on this socially, politi-
cally, and economically charged path? The EU provides an obvious but imperfect role
model-imperfect, only because the EU goals of complete social and economic inte-
gration exceed NAFTA's objectives. The EU provides a federalist structure, into which
NAFTA may eventually grow.237 But for now, while the United States may acknowl-
edge its economic dependence on Mexican labor migration, its desire to protect national
sovereignty remains a key issue.
A more comfortable governing model is the Environmental Side Agreement. Like the
EU, it creates supranational governing institutions. Like the EU, it examines the policy
of its member nations. Unlike the EU, its judicial branch does not wield great powers of
jurisdiction and interpretation. NAFTA states may adopt and expand this model, in order
to achieve interim goals toward liberalized labor migration.
Regardless of the steps the United States chooses, one thing is certain-the free move-
ment of workers from Mexico means big benefits to the United States. As President Bush,
economists, and migration proponents have repeated, the United States stands poised to
gain economic benefits, border control savings, and a long-lasting ally in Mexico.
If the United States and Mexico intend to forge a lasting labor migration agree-
ment, the two nations must move past the temporary fix that the current amnesty and
guest-worker proposals offer. The United States and Mexico should bilaterally agree to
immediately alter U.S.-Mexican immigration policy to reflect actual migration patterns.
This agreement should impart shared responsibility and mutual benefit. Upon taking
that step, the United States and Mexico can make incremental updates, that gradually
wear away the last barrier to trade-the barrier against free labor movement.
A bilateral agreement that propels all three NAFTA states toward founding a NAFTA
Labor Migration Side Agreement is the logical conclusion to the United States-Mexico
agreement. Once these two NAFTA states successfully resolve the labor migration issue,
Canada may join in to create an unimpeded free labor market. All three NAFTA states
would retain the ability to govern the terms of labor migration, as in the United States-
Mexico agreement. Following the EU federalist model, the NAFTA states can create
a governing structure within a Labor Migration Side Agreement. This structure may
serve as a starting point for ultimately achieving further NAFTA integration. With the
United States and Mexico at the start of this journey toward integration, all three NAFTA
states can eventually make incremental steps, together, toward the harmonization of
migration policy.
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